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Introduction 
  
   Over the past decades there have been numerous attempts to measure the effects of 
candidate’s spending on election outcome.  Many of the literature came up with the 
conclusion that the spending by challengers greatly increases the challengers vote 
share but that spending by incumbents has little or even negative effect.  Many 
academics believe that this result doesn’t seem reasonable. As Gerber says “In theory, 
incumbent spending may be more effective than challenger spending. Incumbents, 
typically, have advantages in organization and expertise that make their expenditures 
more efficient and therefore more effective dollar for dollar than those of challengers” 
(Gerber 1998, 402).  And, even if according to Hubert Humphrey raising money is a 
“disgusting, degrading, demeaning experience”, then why incumbents continue to 
raise money when they know from the scientist that campaign spending cannot raise 
their vote share (Levitt, 1995).  According to Levitt (1995) the conclusion that the 
challenger’s expenditures are effective but the incumbent’s expenditures are not is a 
“conventional wisdom among political scientists”. 
  This opposition between the theoretically expected and the empirically unexpected 
gave birth to a puzzle and actually few alternative choices really exist:  to explain why 
these empirical findings make sense theoretically, to improve the empirical methods 
correcting for possible problems that emerge or even control for both of these.  
   Many academics used alternative estimation methods (TSLS, panel data etc.) to 
control for data problems that emerge (simultaneity bias etc) with cross-section 
analysis or used extra significant variables while others tried to give a theoretical 
explanation of the unexpected empirical result of incumbent’s expenditures. 
  This article estimates the effect that incumbent’s and challenger’s spending has on 
incumbent’s vote percentage using ordinary least squares and two stage least squares 
and the effect of these spending on the possibility that incumbents have to win the 
elections through logit regressions.  
  The results showed that challenger’s disbursements for campaign effect negatively 
incumbent’s vote percentage and also negatively incumbents possibility to win but 
their own campaign spending doesn’t affect nether their vote percentage nor their 
victory possibility.   
  In the first section a quick view of the previous literature is described. In second 
section we see a quick review of the dataset, the variables and a summary of their 
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descriptive statistics and in third section the used models and methodology. In forth 
section follows the results and finally the conclusions in the last section.  
 
Literature 
 
  The result that challenger spending is important while incumbent spending is not has 
been verified consistently by OLS regressions.  
   Grantz,  Abramowitz and Burkart (1976) using ols regressions studied the 1972 
House of Representatives elections .They found that challenger’s, but not 
incumbent’s, expenditures have a significant effect on the election outcome. The 
explanation they gave is that the campaign is the only opportunity the challenger has 
to make an impression on the electorate. So, if an incumbent enters the campaign with 
a well established reputation he probably can do little to change during the short 
campaign.  
   Jacobson (1978) using the same estimating method came up with the same 
conclusion on House of Representatives and Senate elections in years 1972 and 1974.   
The same conclusion has been derived from the logit analysis that he used in his 
1990’s survey. He gave a similar theoretical explanation about ineffectiveness of 
incumbent spending, that the incumbent is well known to the voters, and so any 
additional advertisement (or communication) will add relatively little to their 
knowledge.  Challengers, in contrast, are generally unknown and so benefit greatly 
from campaign exposure (Jacobson 1978, 1990).  
   Abramowitz (1988) using OLS regressions found similar results for the Senate 
election outcomes between 1974 and 1986, where the spending by challengers had 
three times as large an impact on the election outcome as spending by incumbents. 
One of his conclusions is that “The challenger’s campaign expenditures are the single 
most important variable affecting an incumbent senator’s chance of being reelected. 
Although an incumbent faced with a well-financed challenger can usually respond by 
increasing his or her own campaign spending, the incumbent’s spending has much 
less impact on the outcome of a Senate race than the challenger’s spending” 
(Abramowitz 1988, 397).   
   Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) through OLS regressions came up with the same 
conclusion, this time in state house elections, using data from 1984 to 1988.  While 
money spent by challengers has a significant impact on the vote share in almost every 
5 
 
state, money spent by incumbents apparently does not.  Only in two states do 
incumbent expenditures appear to make a difference in the vote but, this result is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that incumbents spend because they are in trouble, writers 
says.  
   Palda and Palda (1998) using ols regressions, estimates the effect of campaign 
money on the votes of candidates for the 1993 elections to the legislative assembly in 
France. They found that challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as 
incumbent’s challengers.  
   Under certain circumstances, Coates (1998) even suggests that additional spending 
by incumbents can hurt their chances to winning. In his paper no incumbent is found 
to have a positive and statistically significant marginal impact of spending, contrary 
some of them were distinguishable from zero but negative.  
   Hudson (2006) uses OLS to exam Florida congressional elections between an 
incumbent and a challenger from 1996 until 2006. His estimates, unlike the previous 
literature, show an extremely small impact of the candidate’s spending on election 
outcomes of both incumbent and challenger. 
   Many academics believe that it is more possible that they have been unable to find 
significant positive impact of incumbent spending because of data problems (like 
simultaneity bias).  
   Although, Grier (1989), using OLS estimations in Senate elections between 1978 
and 1984 show that there are a significant number of elections where incumbent 
spending does matter, and that simultaneity bias may not be a tenable explanation for 
results where incumbent spending do not matter. He argues that the simultaneity 
problem described by Jacobson is not theoretically inevitable, and present a statistical 
specification test that does not reject the validity of Ordinary Least Squares (ols) in 
that dataset (Senate).   
   The majority, however, of the researchers believe that the OLS models produce 
biased and inconsistent estimates of the true parameters because endogenous 
variables, treated as explanatory variables, are correlated with the error term.  
   That problem, known as “endogeneity” problem, means that the election outcome 
and campaign spending are simultaneously determined. Campaign spending may 
affect the vote, but the (expected) vote affects campaign contributions, and thus 
spending (Jacobson, 1990).  As challenger’s election prospects improve it is easier for 
them to raise money and thus spending by challengers may appear to be more 
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effective than it really is. On the other hand as incumbents election prospects improve 
they reduce their campaign disbursements. 
   The Stone’s, Fulton’s, Maisel’s and Maestras’s (2004) result from 1998 election is 
that, incumbent spending increases dramatically with decreased incumbent vote share 
but challenger spending is associated with increases in their vote share.  Data such as 
these make it easier to believe that incumbents are responding to a threatening 
situation (as evidenced by the level of challenger spending) by spending more.   
   To address the fact that both the election outcome and spending are endogenous 
variables, some academics have used simultaneous equation models (usually two 
stage least squares).  
   Jacobson (1978) using instrumental variables in House election upholds the 
traditional result that incumbent spending has negligible impacts on election 
outcomes.  
   Green and Krasno (1988) find that greater spending significantly improves the 
incumbent’s share of the vote. To correct of simultaneity bias they used lagged 
incumbent spending as an instrument variable.     
   Gerber although worries about the assumption that Green and Krasno make in their 
article, that only incumbent spending is endogenous and challengers spending is 
exogenous. “If this assumption is false, then inconsistent estimates of both challenger 
and incumbent spending effects will result” (Gerber, 403). Green’s and Krasno’s 
(1988) article received also critic from Jacobson (1990).   
   Gerber (1998) using ols regressions (cross-sectional analyses) for the Senate 
elections can up with a conclusion that incumbent spending is only about half as 
effective as challenger spending.  Although, after taking the endogeneity into account 
through TSLS estimations, came up with a conclusion that the marginal effects of 
incumbent and challenger spending are statistically equivalent.    
   Erikson and Palfrey (1998) using TSLS estimation analyzed spending effects for 
different seniority levels and find that current incumbent spending matters and that the 
effect of this spending varies systematically over the career, beginning as a very 
strong effect and eventually declining with seniority.  That means that incumbent 
spending has a long term effect on incumbent success. Current spending not only 
affects current election outcome but has persistence to it, which it also contribute to 
the oftnoted advantage of the incumbency in congressional elections.        
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   Erikson and Palfrey (2000) also show that endogeneity bias will be least severe 
among elections that are expected to be very close. “When a close race is expected, 
both spending and spending effects can be reliably estimated by OLS”, they say 
(Erikson and Palfrey 2000, 595). Among these elections ols regressions reveals a 
significant positive affect of incumbent spending on their vote shares and the 
spending effects are of roughly equal magnitude for incumbents and challengers. 
   Abramovitz (1991) used OLS regressions on data from 1974-1976 and 1984-1986 
House of Representative elections but attempted to neutralize the simultaneity bias by 
using Congressional quarterly forecasts of elections outcomes as a control of 
expectations. Even with this control negligible coefficients for incumbent spending 
were found and Abramowitz concluded that incumbent spending has little effect on 
the vote.   
   Stratmann (2006) using OLS and TSLS estimations for House general elections in 
1996, 1998 and 2000 also finds that incumbent money effects outcomes in states 
elections, where the campaign spending are limited. “The marginal product of 
advertising expenditures is higher for all candidates when they run in states with 
campaign finance limits. The findings suggest that voters discount campaign 
advertising when they anticipate that candidates promise favors to interest groups in 
exchange for campaign contributions, and thus the findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that contribution limits reduce the perception of corruption”. “In races with 
incumbents and challengers, both candidates have the same marginal product of 
spending when they run in states with contribution limits” (Stratmann 2006, 24). 
   Pratt (2002a), Coate (2003) and Ashford (2003) also predict that voters are less 
responsive to the campaign message when they believe that candidates have obtained 
campaign funds by promising policy favors to contributors.   
   Another omitted variable issue also concerns academics. It is difficult to measure 
the quality of the candidates, especially that of the challengers. It is true that some 
people have the political skills and personal appeal that attract voters to them, while 
other people do not possess such qualities or characteristics and are not as popular at 
the polls. Characteristics such as charisma, physical attractiveness, oratorical and 
organizational skills and other characteristics make a candidate attractive to voters 
and raise his money ability and his vote’s share. For an incumbent the holding of 
elective office, his political experience, can be a sign of his quality but for a 
challenger this issue is even more complicated.   
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   Green and Krasno (1988)  control for challenger quality (but not for incumbent) 
with an eight point scale the effect of which is statistically significant but it has minor 
effect on the spending coefficients and improve little models fitness.      
   We have to be careful although about this conclusion because everything depends 
on the construction of the variable through which candidates’ quality is measured.     
   The lagged vote is also a variable that can reflect an expression of the candidate’s 
quality and some academics (Stone, Fulton, Maisel and Maestras , 2004, Gierzynski 
and Breaux, 1991, Erikson and Palfrey,2000, etc.) have used these variables to control 
for quality, but no one can insist that this is the perfect solution.  
   It is also difficult to measure district-specific factors that make the districts differ 
systematically and perhaps these differentiations effects both vote share and campaign 
expenditures. An absence of these factors can lead to bias in cross-sectional 
regressions. As Levitt (1994) remarks partisanship across districts can be one of those 
factors. Obviously a Democratic challenger in a staunchly Republican district will 
have smaller ability to raise campaign funds and Republican incumbent’s 
expenditures will also be low because he doesn’t face any important challenger.  That 
leads to an upward bias on the effects on challenger spending and a downward bias on 
the effects on incumbent spending (Levitt, 1994).   It is interesting to notice that since 
the 1970s, and especially since 1992, there has been a substantial increase in partisan 
polarization among House districts (Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning, 2006) that 
probably could give raze to the effectiveness of that variable on election outcomes.      
   Levitt (1994) analyses a subsample from 1972 to 1990 from congressional elections. 
He controls for unobserved candidate quality and district-specific effects using panel 
data set and estimating the effects of spending on elections outcomes among 
candidates who faced each other in, more than one, elections.    
  If the candidate’s quality is constant over time this method eliminates all influences 
of quality.  He also include variables such us incumbency status and national level 
partisan swings. While he finds challenger spending to be marginally more productive 
than incumbent spending, the difference is greatly reduced compared to previous 
studies.  According to his words “campaign spending has an extremely small impact 
on election outcomes regardless of incumbency status. Controlling for candidate 
quality and district fixed effects reduces estimates of the value of challenger spending 
to only one-tenth of the level typically obtained in previous cross-sectional studies” 
Levitt (1994, 780).   
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   According to Stone, Fulton, Maisel and Maestras (2004) omitted variables are 
incumbent and challenger electoral prospects. Without an independent measure of 
incumbent and challenger electoral prospects, problematic assumptions are necessary 
to estimate electoral prospects.  They also believe that the incumbent-prospects 
measure provides reasonable leverage on the omitted variables problem in estimating 
the effects of candidate spending.       
   Theoretically and empirically we want to purse of the strategic component of 
candidates’ and contributors’ behavior. Their behavior and decisions are influenced 
by the strategy that all the other players will follow. If somebody wants to have a 
clear effect of candidate campaign spending he must pursed of this strategic 
component.   
  As the strategic politicians’ literature points out, experienced candidates tend to enter 
races they think they can win and to refrain from entering races they anticipate losing 
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983, Cox and Katz 2002).  
  Stone and Maisel (2001, 2003) and Stone (2004) make a study on candidates’ 
prospects and they measured electoral prospects of the incumbent and challenger 
directly using informed local observers.  
   Using these measures Stone, Fulton, Maisel and Maestras (2004) coming up with a 
conclusion that: “The better incumbent prospects are, the larger their vote shares in 
the election, and the less they spend.” They believe that these opposite effects’ of 
prospects on incumbent spending may produce the negative relationship between 
incumbent spending and election outcomes. Challengers prospects on the other hand 
relate positively to their vote share, but they also relate positively to spending.   
   They gave the same theoretical explanation with Jacobson, that incumbent spending 
has very little effect on incumbent vote share due to saturation in vote awareness and 
that challenger spending has substantial effects on voter’s awareness, due to the 
relatively low level of vote’s recognition of challengers (Jacobson 2004, 132-3). 
   Kenny and McBurnett (1992) estimate a dynamic model of the relationship between 
money and votes in a single congressional race in Indiana’s third district in 1984 (with 
logit regressions). They found money to be not statistically significant for the 
incumbent, except if he waited more than two weeks to spend it (in which case the 
delay reduced the likelihood that someone could vote for him) and  statistically 
significant for the challenger in several instances.  
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  Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994) are trying something more. They breakdown total 
expenditures into three different components: those that involve direct 
communications with the voters, those that are campaign related but not involve direct 
communications with the voters, and those unrelated to the campaign, such as 
transfers to the candidates. Even with this separation, their analysis’ finding is not 
different from the previous literature: challenger spending matters more than 
incumbent spending.   
  Lott (1991) suggests a theoretical explanation for Jacobson’s perverse sign on 
incumbent spending, the omission of candidate brand name capital from the 
estimating equations. He demonstrates that higher brand name capital results in a 
greater probability of winning with a given level of expenditures. If one ignores the 
effect of brand name, the correlation between spending and probability of winning is 
negative. Lott contends that Jacobson finds a negative effect of incumbent spending 
on incumbent electoral success because of an omitted variable. He concludes that 
omission of brand name capital from the vote share regressions in the literature leads 
to a spurious negative relationship between incumbent spending and incumbent vote 
share.  
   Thomas (1989, 1990) develops and tests a theoretical model of the spending vote 
share relationship based on an advertising paradigm. His model implies that the 
marginal effects of incumbent and challengers expenditures depend on the level of 
spending of both candidates. Using OLS estimations for the 1978 and 1980 House of 
Representatives general elections show that the marginal productivity of incumbent 
spending is of the correct sign for most of the observations, though for some 
incumbents it is not. The wrong signed productivities are always very near to zero. 
He also argues that incumbent spending becomes more effective, at the margin, as 
opponent spending rises, and vice versa. Finally, Thomas argues that the absolute 
value of the challenger marginal productivity of expenditure should exceed that of the 
incumbent. 
   Magee (2010) develops and tests a theory to explain the incumbent puzzle following 
logic similar to that in Grier (1989). His theory goes like this: when the incumbent 
faces a well-funded challenger and his re-election becomes in doubt, the incumbent 
spending will be focused on defining the challenger in the eyes of the voters through 
negative advertisement. In this case, the incumbent’s campaign spending will have a 
significant impact on the election outcome. When there is little chance of being 
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defeated in the election, the incumbent will spend money in ways that benefit him in 
the long run but that have little effect on the current election outcome.     
In his empirical scale of work he used three alternative estimation methods (OLS, 
Instrumental variables and fixed effects regression) in raises between a Democratic 
and a Republican running for the House of Representatives between 1972 and 2006.   
He shows that campaign spending by incumbents has a significant positive effect on 
the incumbent’s share of the vote only when challengers spend a significantly large 
amount of money in their election efforts.  
 
 
 
 
Data 
 
  The dataset used in this study consist of 3777 races between incumbents and 
challengers in USA Congressional elections between 1982 and 2004. The used 
variables were:  
  Incumbent’s total vote percentage defined as the incumbent’s general election 
percentage in the district.  
  Incumbent’s victory: is a dummy variable that takes value one if incumbent won the 
elections and zero if incumbent lost the elections.  
  Incumbent’s total disbursements: is a variable that includes incumbent’s total 
disbursements in US dollar deflated with the state gdp deflator (we took the deflator 
as an average of the two year election cycle).   
  Challenger’s total disbursements: this variable includes challenger’s total 
disbursements in US dollar deflated with the previous state gdp deflator. 
  Total disbursements are defined as the total amount that candidates spent to run for 
elections and include expenses that had been made to all directions.  
  Incumbent’s beginning cash: is the incumbent’s cash at the beginning of the election 
race in US dollar deflated with the state level gdp deflator, as above.  
  Challenger’s beginning cash: is the challenger’s cash at the beginning of the election 
race in US dollar deflated with the state level gdp deflator.  
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  Democrat incumbent: is a dummy variable that takes value one if incumbent was 
running at the election race as a Democrat and value zero otherwise (as a Republican 
or from another party).  
  Republican incumbent: is a dummy variable that takes value one if incumbent was 
running as a Republican at the election race and value zero otherwise (as a Democrat 
or from another party).     
  All the above variables come from Federal Election Commission the website of 
which is www.fec.gov. 
  Incumbent leader: is a dummy variable which takes value one if incumbent was 
Speaker of the House, majority leader, minority leader, Democratic Chairman, 
Republican Chairman, Democratic Whips or Republican Whips during the election 
period and zero otherwise. 
   Incumbent had been leader:  is a dummy variable which takes value one if 
incumbent had been Speaker of the House, majority leader, minority leader, 
Democratic Chairman, Republican Chairman, Democratic Whips or Republican 
Whips before the election period and zero otherwise. 
  Incumbent chair or ranking member: is a dummy variable which takes value one if 
incumbent was holding a committee chair or if he/she was a committee ranking 
member during or before the election period and zero otherwise.  
  Incumbent’s army: is a dummy variable which takes value one if incumbent had 
served in the army and zero otherwise.  
  Incumbent’s phd: is a dummy variable which takes value one if incumbent has a phd 
and zero otherwise. 
  Incumbent female: is a dummy variable that controls for gender differences and 
takes value one if incumbent is female and zero if is male. 
  State political conditions: is defined as the difference between the percentage of 
Democrats and the percentage of Republicans in each state. This variable is used to 
capture partisan differences across states (state partisanship).  
  These variables come from the United States House of Representatives the website 
of which is www.House.gov.  
  Unemployment rate: is the unemployment rate by state during the year of the 
election. 
  Real per capita personal income: is the state real per capita personal income in 2000 
prices defined as the average of the two years election cycle. 
13 
 
  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics about the used variables. 
 
table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Incumbent won 5583 0.948 0.222 0 1 
Incumbent's general persentage 5583 68.079 16.339 0 100 
Incumbent total disbursements 5534 637399.4 538802.300 0 7944668.0 
Challenger total disbursements 4488 303680.7 527034.200 0 8466350.0 
Incumbent's beginning cash 5491 157720.6 252242.700 0 4070605.0 
Challenger's beginning cash 4488 1450.7 11042.710 0 370339.8 
Incumbent leader 5583 0.016 0.125 0 1 
Incumbent had been leader 5583 0.021 0.143 0 1 
Incumbent chair or ranking 5583 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Incumbent Army 5504 0.400 0.490 0 1 
Iincumbent phd 5504 0.043 0.204 0 1 
Incumbent female 5503 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Democrat incumbent 5583 0.551 0.497 0 1 
Republican incumbent 5583 0.445 0.497 0 1 
State political conditions 4751 0.396 0.281 0 1 
State real per capital income 5534 24795.0 5622.103 12015.0 47558 
State unemployment rate 5534 6.158 1.977 2.258 16 
 
  As we can see, incumbents during this period received 68% of the votes on average 
which reveals the tremendous advantage that incumbents have over challengers in 
general. 
 Challengers spend on average $ 303,680 in real dollars while incumbents spend about 
$ 637,399 on average; difference which also reveals the monetary incumbent’s 
advantage.  
  Incumbent’s beginning cash is much higher than challenger’s on average that shows 
the benefited incumbent’s position from the beginning of the election race.  
  Only a few of the incumbents (1,6%) had the fundraising advantage of being in a 
leadership position and 2% of them had been in a leadership position in the past; 
  According to descriptive 26% of the incumbents were holding a committee chair or 
were committee ranking member. 
  A 8,9% were female, 4,3% had a phd and 40% served in the army. 
  Almost 40% was on average the percentage distance between Democrats and 
Republicans vote percentage at a district.  
  Finally, Democrat incumbents are 10% more than Republican and a very small 
percentage of them come from other parties 
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Model and Methodology 
   
  In the first part I estimate the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS) for 
years between 1982 and 2004 Congressional elections. 
 
  IVit = α + β1 ΙDit  + β2 CDit + β3 IDemit + β4 ILit + β5 IhbLit+ β6 ICRit +      
           + β7 SPCit + β8 RPCIit + β9 Uit + eit                                            (1)  
  
  Where α is the intercept, the β’s regression coefficients, and e the error or 
disturbance term. Where IVit  is incumbent’s total vote percentage, ΙDit  and CDit  are 
incumbent’s and challenger’s disbursements, where IDemit is the dummy variable that 
controls for party differences, ILit and IhbLit  are incumbents present (during the 
election period) and previous leadership position, ICRit  is incumbent’s experience as 
a chair or ranking committee member, SPCit are the state political conditions,  RPCIit  
is the state real per capita income and Uit is the state unemployment rate.    
   The Democrat incumbent variable is used as a party variable that accounts for short-
term forces favoring one party or another in a particular election year. Both the party 
and state political conditions variables are expected to affect incumbent ability to raise 
money as well as to win votes and so must be taken into account. 
   Previous experience and leadership position can be one of those advantages that 
incumbents enjoy over the challengers. Being a leader may reflect a charismatic 
personality, communication abilities; recognition from the rest of the members; better 
fundraising abilities and better image in the eyes of the voters. Even if all of these are 
hypothesis it is not easy for someone to say that incumbents have no advantage from a 
position like this and that must be taken into account.  The dummy variable 
“Incumbent chair or ranking member” counts for incumbent’s political experience 
from holding an office; an experience that might benefit them and so must be taken 
into account. 
   Entered also independent variables to control for macroeconomic factors that might 
affect incumbent’s vote share are unemployment rate by state during the year of the 
election and real per capita personal income in 2000 prices defined as the average of 
the two years election cycle. 
   Challenger and incumbent disbursements are entered as separate variables rather 
than as some composite because their coefficients are not expected to be the same.  
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  The functional relationship between spending and votes is assumed to be linear. This 
has the advantage of simplicity but the drawback that it fails to allow for the 
diminishing returns that must apply to campaign spending.    
 
  A hypothesis that is been taken on the above is that there is no correlation between 
the independent variables. If such a relation exist than it must be taken into account. 
According to literature endogeneity bias exist in incumbents and challengers 
expenditures. To overcome these problems I used TSLS.  
  The first stage regressions for incumbent’s and challenger’s disbursements and the 
second stage regression for the incumbent’s vote percentage are: 
   
 ΙD*it = b0 + b1 IDemit + b2 ILit + b3 IhbLit+ b4 ICRit + b5 SPCit   
            + b6 RPCIit + b7 Uit +  b8 phdit + b9 Ait +  b10 Git + vit            (2) 
CD*it = a0 + a1 IDemit + a2 ILit + a3 IhbLit+ a4 ICRit + a5 SPCit   
            + a6 RPCIit + a7 Uit + a8 phdit + a9 Ait +  a10 Git + uit             (3) 
IVit = α + β1 ΙD*it  +  β2 CD*it + β3 IDemit + β4 ILit + β5 IhbLit+ β6 ICRit 
          + β7 SPCit + β8 RPCIit + β9 Uit + eit                                         (4)   
 
   Where α, a0, b0, are the intercepts, the β’s, b’s and a’s regressions coefficients, and 
e, v, u the errors terms. Vote share regression has two instrumental variables ΙD*it and 
CD*it   defined as (2) and (3) equations and the rest of them are the same with these in 
ols regression. These variables exist also on the right hand of Incumbent’s and 
challenger’s disbursement regressions plus the variables phdit for incumbent’s phd, Ait 
for incumbent’s army experience and Git for incumbent’s gender.  
   
   A candidate can win or lose the election. Under this perspective we can estimate not 
the effect that candidate’s campaign spending has on the incumbent’s election 
outcome but rather the effect that this spending has on the possibility that incumbent 
has to win the elections.  In other words we will transform the vote share as a bivary 
variable with value one if the candidate’s vote percentage is greater than 50% and 
value zero otherwise. The dependent variable is categorical, so an estimation 
technique appropriate to limited dependent variable is required. Probit and logit are 
the principle alternatives. I chose logit, as Jacobson did in his 1990 work, because 
some analyses involved unordered polychotomous dependent variables, and probit 
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demands ordered categories (Jacobson, 1990). An analytic logistic regression’s theory 
is described at the abstract.  
   The equation estimated with logit is: 
 
IWit = α + γ1 ΙDit  +  γ2 CDit + γ3 IDemit + γ4 ILit + γ5 IhbLit+ γ6 ICRit 
          + γ7 SPCit + γ9 RPCIit + γ9 Uit + eit                                        (5) 
 
where eit is the error term, IWit  is the bivary variable that takes value one if incumbent 
won the elections and zero otherwise and the rest variables are the same with the 
variables on the right side of equations (1).  
 
 
Results 
 
   Table 2 presents the results of the voting regression with ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  The results shows the common OLS result in the literature that spending by 
challengers significantly reduces the incumbent’s share of the vote, but spending by 
incumbents also appears to hurt the incumbent and both coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. More specifically an extra $100,000 in challenger’s money 
lowers the incumbent’s vote share by 0.92% percentage points and the same extra 
amount in incumbent’s disbursements can hurt her/his vote share by 0.17% 
percentage points keeping the rest variables stable. 
 
Table 2: OLS Regression 
 
Depentent variable: Incumbent's total vote percentage in the 
district. 
Variable                       Coefficients 
Incumbent total disbursements                   -0.171*** 
Challenger total disbursements                   -0.918*** 
Democrat incumbent                   0.720** 
Incumbent leader                1.882 
Incumbent had been leader                1.743 
Incumbent chair or ranking               -0.544 
State political conditions                         12.401*** 
State real per capital income                      0.0002*** 
State unemployment rate                 -0.176* 
Constant                    59.942*** 
  
Observations 3777 
Adj R-squared  0.297 
F( 9,  3767)  178.77 
Prob > F                                         0.000 
*,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%,1% level. 
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  But this result is been driver by the fact that the OLS regression threats spending by 
incumbents as exogenous. In reality the incumbents increase their efforts to raise 
money and spend it in the campaign as their share of the vote declines. These 
expectations make spending an endogenous variable and that must be taken under 
control. For that reason two stage least squares (TSLS) regression had been estimated.   
 
   Table 3 presents the first-stage regressions showing the determinants of spending by 
challengers and incumbents between 1982 and 2004.  
   Incumbents who had leadership position during election period or in the past spend 
$ 965,000 and $ 228,800 more than those who did not had such a benefit position and 
these results show the fundraising advantage that some incumbents have over the rest 
of the incumbents and the challengers. Unlike Magee results; challengers doesn’t 
spend more money when they facing incumbents in leadership positions; and being a 
chair or a ranking member doesn’t affect candidate disbursements.   
 
table 3 : First Stage Regressions. 
  Incumbent's disbursements  Challenger's disbursements 
Variable                              Coefficient                                Coefficient 
Incumbent Democrat                               -0.444***                              -0.017  
Incumbent leader                                9.650***                               0.967  
Incumbent had been leader                               2.288**                              -0.016  
Incumbent chair or ranking                           0.266                              -0.019  
Iincumbent phd                               1.024***                                 0.928**  
Incumbent female                            0.394                                   0.974***  
Incumbent army                            0.005                               0.014  
Incumbent's beginning cash                                0.258***                              -0.046  
Challenger's beginning cash                                5.228***                                12.154*** 
Real per capita income                              18.680***                              0.412 
Unemployment rate                               -0.022***                                -0.009**  
State political conditions                               -4.989***                                 -5.138***  
Constant                                    4.732***                                      5.048*** 
      
Number of obs 3751 3751 
Adj R-squared 0.257 0.141 
F( 12,  3738) 109.23                                           52.40 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
*,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%,1% level. 
 
  The results shows also that it is not important for the challengers the money ability 
that incumbents have at the beginning of the election race. This result is inconsistent 
with the idea that high quality challengers who are capable to raising considerable 
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sums of money are deterred from entering races in which the incumbents has a large 
war chest available to spend.  
  Challengers who have cash at the beginning of the campaign end up spending 
considerably more in their efforts to unseat the incumbent.    
  Incumbents on the other hand end up spend $ 523,600 more in every extra $ 100,000 
that challengers have at the beginning of the election race; which clearly means that 
incumbents spend more money when they are facing serious challengers; a common 
idea in the literature. 
 The army and the gender does not affect campaign spending of the incumbents but 
according to results female challengers spend more and perhaps receive more 
contributions than the male challengers. Challengers and incumbents with phd also 
spend more money.    
    As real per capita personal income raises incumbents spend more money; but that is 
not a factor for challenger’s disbursements. Contrary to that as unemployment rate 
increase spending by incumbents and challengers declines.  
   According to results as the distance between Democrats and Republicans in each 
state getting wider incumbents and challengers feel safer about the election outcome 
and reduce their disbursements.   
   The F-statistic testing the hypothesis that all coefficients on the instrumental 
variables are zero are shown at the bottom of the table (F=109.23 and F= 52.40) and 
are large enough to allay fears that the instruments are weak. 
     
  The instrumental variables regressions presented at table 4 shows an importance 
difference from the previous OLS results. As in most of the papers challenger’s 
disbursements have a negative effect on incumbents vote percentage but the 
coefficient of incumbent’s disbursements is not statistically significant.  
   State political conditions seem to have a huge effect on the incumbents vote share; 
statistically significant in 1% level.  An extra one point percentage distance between 
Democrat and Republican vote percentage in the district can increase the incumbent’s 
vote share by 14%. 
  Coefficient of the incumbent’s party identification is statistically significant at 10% 
level indicating that a Democrat incumbent (contrary to incumbents from other 
parties) has 0.7% vote precedence.    
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Regression (TSLS). 
Depentent variable: Incumbent's total vote percentage in the district. 
Variable                                    Coefficients 
Incumbent total disbursements                                           -0.001 
Challenger total disbursements                                       -0.760*** 
Democrat incumbent                                      0.724* 
Incumbent leader                                     0.293 
Incumbent had been leader                                     1.309 
Incumbent chair or ranking                                    -0.560 
State political conditions 14.044*** 
State real per capital income      0.0002** 
State unemployment rate                                    -0.112 
Constant 58.261*** 
    
Observations 3751 
Adj R-squared  0.287 
F( 9,  3741)  89.88 
Prob > F       0.000 
    
*,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%,1% level. 
 
  Surprisingly according to results incumbent’s leadership position or experience does 
not affect incumbent’s vote percentage.  
  Finally the results show significantly and positive effect from the state real per capita 
personal income and insignificant effect from the state unemployment rate. 
   
 
   Table 5 present estimates from TSLS regressions by election period.  As we can see 
challenger’s disbursements coefficients are statistically significant only in five of 
twelve election periods with negative sign and at least in 10% level. Incumbent’s 
disbursements coefficients on the other hand are insignificant in all cases confirming 
the above results (table 4).     
   Real per capita income and unemployment rate are not statistically significant (with 
one exception) and that is not absurd if we consider that the variability of these 
variables is limited to differences between the states and not between the elections 
periods as before. Additionally, these results could be different if the variables were in 
district rather than in state level.  
   Party variable is significant in seven of the twelve cases with negative and positive 
signs favoring and not favoring Democrats party in each particular election period.  
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables Regressions (TSLS) by election period. 
Depentent variable: Incumbent's total vote percentage in the district. 
  
Coefficients 
Variables 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Incumbent total disbursements                         -0.123 1.130 -0.136 0.263  0.881 -0.507 
Challenger total disbursements  -0.553 -2.160 -0.388     -0.707      -1.750* -0.642 
Democrat incumbent 6.384*** -5.162*** 5.446*** 1.075   2.324* -1.330 
Incumbent leader -0.558    29.341**    -3.142     -4.264    -18.398   2.849 
Incumbent had been leader  5.128   -27.731**  7.198     dropped     12.605  2.853 
Incumbent chair or ranking  2.698  -0.559 -1.160     -0.930 0.120  0.133 
State political conditions  15.836** 22.003*** 17.542***   16.024***    9.364***  4.047 
State real per capital income   0.0003    -0.00002   0.0003   0.0002 -0.0002    0.0004 
State unemployment rate     -0.626 0.133    -0.191 0.701      0.377  0.263 
Constant    57.068***  60.346*** 55.608***   54.212*** 57.686*** 53.379*** 
            
Observations 320 319 293 310 294 320 
Adj R-squared  0.233 0.413 0.388 0.346 0.141 0.190 
F statistic  8.25 21.84 16.67 13.34 5.31 0.88 
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.539 
  
Coefficients 
Variables 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Incumbent total disbursements    -0.142 -0.768 -0.436 0.675 0.785 -0.511 
Challenger total disbursements    -1.070**   -1.140** -0.204   -1.130*** -1.000* -0.515 
Democrat incumbent    -8.283*** 3.178 1.748   2.738** -2.143   2.715** 
Incumbent leader    10.421    21.433   12.217    -6.612 -7.326   2.767 
Incumbent had been leader    -0.763    -5.152   -1.345    -2.155 -1.257   7.714 
Incumbent chair or ranking    -2.289    -1.238    1.900    -1.389 -1.293 -3.724*** 
State political conditions   21.278***     9.449  23.434*** 16.081***   14.350** 10.662 
State real per capital income   0.0005** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001    0.0002 0.0002 
State unemployment rate     0.005    -0.110    0.318    -0.637 -0.361  -0.674 
Constant   54.759*** 66.320*** 54.374*** 57.679***    53.008*** 65.185*** 
              
Observations 333 349 298 321 271 323 
Adj R-squared  0.416 0.406 0.380 0.355 0.120 0.346 
F statistic  20.93 25.15 18.61 16.21 4.67 14.69 
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
    Table 6 presents estimates from logit regression with incumbent’s victory as the 
dependent variable.  
  According to results coefficient from challenger’s total disbursements is significant 
at 1% level but coefficient from incumbent’s total disbursements in not; indicating 
that a raise in challenger’s disbursements reduces incumbent’s possibility of victory 
but a raise in incumbent’s disbursements does not effects their possibility to win.   
  Similar to TSLS results incumbent’s leadership position and experience doesn’t 
affect their possibility to win.  
  Unlike the previous results if incumbent is Democrat his possibility to win the 
elections declines.   
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Table 6: logistic Regression. 
Depentent variable: Incumbent's won. 
Variable                                    Coefficients 
Incumbent total disbursements                                0.022 
Challenger total disbursements                                         -0.180*** 
Democrat incumbent                                   -0.088*** 
Incumbent leader                                1.741 
Incumbent had been leader                               -0.419 
Incumbent chair or ranking                                0.019 
State political conditions                                   1.920*** 
State real per capital income  0.00007*** 
State unemployment rate                                   -0.118*** 
Constant                                    2.286*** 
    
Observations 3777 
Pseudo R-squared 0.228 
Log Likelihood  -615.21 
    
*,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%,1% level. 
   
  State political conditions affect positively the possibility that incumbent has to win 
the election outcome. An extra one percent distance between Democrats and 
Republicans in a district can increase incumbent’s victory possibility by 1.2 %.  
  Positively also effects incumbent’s possibility of win an increase in real per capita 
income and negatively an increase in unemployment rate.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
   Purpose of this study was to measure empirically the effect of incumbent’s and 
challenger’s campaign spending on incumbent’s vote percentage on USA 
congressional elections between 1982 and 2004. The dataset consist of 3777 races 
between incumbents and challengers.  
   I used OLS and TSLS regressions for these estimates as the previous studies did in 
an extended dataset (the same dataset with Magee but with new added variables like 
the state unemployment rate and the real per capita income) to compare for possible 
outcome differences.    
   I also view the dependent variable “incumbent’s vote percentage” as a bivary 
variable and estimate through logit regressions the effect of incumbent’s and 
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challenger’s campaign disbursements on the possibility that incumbents have to win 
the elections.  
   Results from OLS regressions show a negative effect on incumbent’s vote share 
from both challenger’s and incumbent’s disbursements. Although the endogeneity 
problem; the existence of which most academics remark; produce doubts about this 
result and for that reason a two stage least squares used.  
  The result from TSLS regressions showed that challenger’s disbursements for 
campaign effect negatively incumbents vote percentage but incumbent’s campaign 
spending does not significantly affect their vote share.  
  The logit estimates showed a similar result. A raise in challenger’s disbursements 
reduces incumbent’s possibility of victory but a raise in incumbent’s disbursements 
does not affect their possibility to win.  
  The theoretical explanation about this according to the previous literature is that the 
incumbents are already known to the voters and that’s why an extra advertisement 
cannot add something new to the voter’s knowledge about them.  
  Another conclusion is that incumbent’s spend more money when they face serious 
opposition; when for our instance they face challengers with big amount of beginning 
cash; a commonly accepted idea from the academics. 
  These conclusions do not actually solve or add something new to the existing 
knowledge about the “incumbent puzzle” and a wider search with new methods 
or/and new significant variable is I believe a necessity.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
  An analytic logistic regression’s description follows:    
  We view yi as a realization of a random variable Yi that can take the values one and 
zero with probabilities pi and pi-1 representatively.  
                               yi =  {    1 if yi*> 1/2 
                                            0 otherwise 
 
   The distribution of Yi with parameter pi can be written: 
 
                           Pr (Yi = yi) = piyi(1-pi1-yi) 
 
for yi = 0; 1.  Note that if yi = 1 we obtain pi, and if yi = 0 we obtain 1-pi. The 
expected value and variance of Yi are 
 
                          E(Yi) = µi = pi 
                          Var(Yi) = σi2 = pi(1-pi) 
 
  Any factor that affects the probability will alter not just the mean but also the 
variance of the observations.  
 
  If the probabilities pi depend on a vector of observed covariates xi and the simplest 
idea would be to let pi be a linear function of the covariates, say 
 
                            pi = xi’β 
 
where β is a vector of regression coefficients in our case the vector of γ’s coefficients.       
  This model is sometimes called the linear probability model and is often estimated using 
maximum likelihood statistic.  
 
  The problem with this model is that the probability pi on the left hand side has to be 
between zero and one, but the linear predictor  xi’β on the right hand side can take any 
real value, so there is no guarantee that the predicted values will be in the correct 
range unless complex restrictions are imposed on the coefficients.   
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  A simple solution to this problem is to transform the probability to remove the range 
restrictions, and model the transformation on a linear function of the covariates.  
We do this in two steps. 
First, we move from the probability pi to the odds 
 
                                 oddsi =  
 
defined as the ratio of the probability to its complement, or the ratio of favorable to 
unfavorable cases. If the probability of an event is a half, the odds are one-to-one or 
even. If the probability is 1/3, the odds are one-to-two. If the probability is very small, 
the odds are said to be long. 
  Second, we take logarithms, calculating the logit or log-odds 
 
                           ηi = logit(pi) = log  
 
which has the effect of removing the floor restriction. Note that as the probability 
goes to zero the odds approaches zero and the logit approaches -∞. At the other 
extreme, as the probability approaches one the odds approach +∞ and so does the 
logit. Thus the logits map probabilities from range (0,1) to the entire real line.  
Note that if the probability is 1/2 the odds are even and the logit is zero. Negative 
logits represent probabilities below one half and positive logits correspond to 
probabilities above one half.  
  The inverse transformation is sometimes called the antilogit, and allows us go back 
from logits to probabilities. Solving for pi in previous equation gives: 
 
                                 pi = logit-1(ηi) =  
 
  We are now in a position to define the logistic regression model, by assuming that 
the logit of the probability pi, rather than the probability itself, follows a linear model. 
  This expression is the standard logistic distribution which is symmetric, has mean 
zero and variance π2/3. 
  We assume that the logit of the probability pi rather than the probability itself 
follows a linear model.  
  Suppose that the logit of the probability pi is a linear function of the predictors  
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                         logit(pi) = xi’β                                
 
where xi is a vector of covariates and β is a vector of regression coefficients.  
The regression coefficients βj can be interpreted along the same lines as in linear 
models, bearing in mind that the left-hand-side is a logit rather than a mean. Thus, βj 
represents the change in the logit of the probability associated with a unit change in 
the j-th predictor holding all other predictors constant. 
  Exponentiating equation before we find that the odds for the  i-th unit are given by     
     
                         = exp{ xi’β }           
 
  This expression defines a multiplicative model for the odds. 
  Solving for the probability pi in the logit model in equation logit(pi) = xi’β                              
gives the more complicated model 
 
                         pi=  
 
  While the left-hand-side is in the familiar probability scale, the right-hand-side is a 
non-linear function of the predictors. 
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